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Indonesian Technocracy in Transition:  
A Preliminary Analysis*
Shiraishi Takashi**
Indonesia underwent enormous political and institutional changes in the wake of 
the 1997–98 economic crisis and the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. 
Yet something curious happened under President Yudhoyono: a politics of economic 
growth has returned in post-crisis decentralized, democratic Indonesia.  The politics 
of economic growth is politics that transforms political issues of redistribution into 
problems of output and attempts to neutralize social conflict in favor of a consensus 
on growth.  Under Soeharto, this politics provided ideological legitimation to his 
authoritarian regime.  The new politics of economic growth in post-Soeharto Indo-
nesia works differently.  Decentralized democracy created a new set of conditions 
for doing politics: social divisions along ethnic and religious lines are no longer 
suppressed but are contained locally.  A new institutional framework was also cre-
ated for the economic policy-making.  The 1999 Central Bank Law guarantees the 
independence of the Bank Indonesia (BI) from the government.  The Law on State 
Finance requires the government to keep the annual budget deficit below 3% of the 
GDP while also expanding the powers of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) at the 
expense of National Development Planning Agency.  No longer insulated in a state 
of political demobilization as under Soeharto, Indonesian technocracy depends for 
its performance on who runs these institutions and the complex political processes 
that inform their decisions and operations.
Keywords: Indonesia, technocrats, technocracy, decentralization, democratization, 
central bank, Ministry of Finance, National Development Planning 
Agency
At a time when Indonesia is seen as a success story, with its economy growing at 5.9% 
on average in the post-global financial crisis years of 2009 to 2012 and performing better 
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than its neighbor economies of Malaysia (with its economic growth of 4.1% a year in 
2009–12), the Philippines (4.8%), and Thailand (3.0%), it is easy to forget that less than 
a decade ago many people wondered and worried whether Indonesia would turn into a 
Yugoslavia, in danger of breaking up owing to ethnic and religious tensions, or a Pakistan, 
subject to periodic military intervention and the rising jihadist threat, or a Philippines, 
democratic but with insurgencies simmering in the provinces and a weak and stagnant 
economy.
Nothing of this sort has happened.  Instead, and most remarkably, a politics of eco-
nomic growth has returned, but under conditions that are different from the politics of 
economic development pursued by Soeharto under the New Order.
The politics of economic growth is politics that transforms political issues of redis-
tribution into problems of output and attempts to neutralize social conflict in favor of a 
consensus on growth, thus creating a “virtuous” cycle of political stability which leads to 
economic development which leads to the rising living standard which in turn leads to 
further political stability.  Under Soeharto, this politics provided the ideological legitima-
tion to his authoritarian state, while also delivering on its promise to improve the living 
standards of a substantial majority of the Indonesian people, helping to create a sizeable 
Indonesian middle class.  In this context, technocrats emerged as major allies of Soeharto, 
working closely with the President on all economic policy issues.
The new politics of economic growth works differently under the current decen-
tralized democracy, and technocrats also now work under conditions different from 
 Soeharto’s New Order.  The salience of this politics of economic growth was underscored 
in the reelection of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009 as President.  Public support for 
the incumbent President and his Democratic Party nicely correlated with public percep-
tion of Indonesia’s economic performance.  Thanks in part to the global financial crisis 
that pushed down fuel prices, for which the President took credit, Yudhoyono was 
reelected overwhelmingly in the first round voting with technocrat Budiono as his run-
ning mate.  The resurgence of the politics of economic growth in Indonesia and with it 
the comeback of technocrats as a force (though as vulnerable as the technocrats in 
 Soeharto’s time, but in a different way) in Indonesian politics can be seen in the prestige 
and authority that former Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati enjoys even after 
she was sent off to the International Monetary Fund.
What made technocrats effective as economic policy-makers under Soeharto?  What 
conditions have enabled technocrats to be effective under the current democratic system? 
Who are they in the first place?  The answers to these questions illuminate the important 
but nevertheless fraught position occupied by technocrats in Indonesia’s changing polit-
ical structure and processes of economic policy-making.
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The Making of Indonesian Technocracy
Technocracy in Indonesia emerged and developed in the 1960s and 1970s in tandem with 
the rise and consolidation of Soeharto’s authoritarian developmental state.  Soeharto 
fashioned his New Order regime with the state as his power base and the army as its 
backbone.  The regime was centralized, militarized, and authoritarian.  Army officers 
dominated the military and occupied strategic positions in the civilian arm of the state as 
district chiefs, provincial governors, directors-general, and ministers in the name of dual 
functions.  State power was repeatedly impressed upon regime “enemies”—“com-
munists,” “separatists” in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya), criminals, labor 
activists, journalists, and Islamists.  The government contained the question of social 
divisions along ethnic and religious lines through state repression (politics of stability, 
that is) while it addressed the question of class divisions through its politics of economic 
development.  The government thus achieved the state of political demobilization (as 
opposed high level of political mobilization under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy) deemed 
necessary to national development by barring oppositional groups (whether ethnic, reli-
gious, or political) from participation in the political processes and imposed its politics of 
stability and development on the public.
Technocrats, who were in charge of development, thrived in the state of political 
demobilization under the New Order.  They started their technocratic career in the early 
days of the New Order as Soeharto’s economic advisers.  They were young academics 
trained as economists at Indonesia’s premier university, the University of Indonesia 
(hereinafter UI), and abroad who maintained their academic status as UI professors while 
joining the government as technocrats.  Five of them emerged as key members of 
 Soeharto’s economic team and founding fathers of the Indonesian technocracy: Widjojo 
Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Emil Salim, Subroto, and Mohammad Sadli.
In the early years of the New Order, there were not very many Indonesians who 
had the technical expertise to formulate and manage economic policies and to communi-
cate in the language of economics with their counterparts from other countries such as 
the United States and Japan and from international agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF), the World Bank (hereinafter WB), and the Asian 
Development Bank (hereinafter ADB).  The first-generation of technocrats obtained the 
expertise and the language thanks to their training at foreign, largely American, univer-
sities.  Their small number and close personal relationships with each other (as well as 
their expertise) set them apart from the great majority of civilian bureaucrats and military 
officers who ran the New Order state.  While they could have a significant impact on 
broad economic policies, above all monetary policies and major allocations of government 
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resources, they had relatively little influence on or control over the political and bureau-
cratic processes that enabled the policy implementation of contracts, licenses, promo-
tions, payoffs, and other micro-economic details (Bresnan 1993, 73).
Technocrats enjoyed Soeharto’s trust and confidence as his ally and were appointed 
as ministers in charge of key economic agencies: Widjojo Nitisastro as Chairman of 
 BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) (1967–83), Coordinating 
 Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry (hereinafter Menko, 1973–83), and presi-
dential economic advisor (1993–98);1) Ali Wardhana as Minister of Finance (1973–83) and 
Menko (1983–88);2) Emil Salim as State Minister for State Apparatus (1971–73), Minister 
of Transportation, Communication and Tourism (1973–78), State Minister for Develop-
ment Supervision and Environment (1978–83), and State Minister for Population and 
Environment (1983–93);3) Subroto as Minister of Manpower, Resettlement and Coop-
eratives (1978–83) and Minister of Mining and Energy (1983–88);4) Mohammad Sadli as 
Minister of Manpower (1971–73) and Minister of Mining and Energy (1973–78).5)  They 
were soon followed by their juniors: J. B. Sumarlin who served as State Minister for State 
Apparatus (1973–83), State Minister for National Development Planning and BAPPENAS 
Chairman (1983–88), and Minister of Finance (1988–93);6) Saleh Afif who served as State 
1) Widjojo Nitisastro (UI; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley) joined Soeharto’s advisory team 
in 1966 as a member of the National Economic Stabilization Board.  He was appointed Chairman of 
BAPPENAS in 1967 and served in that position until 1983, while also serving as Menko from 1973 
to 1983.  He was appointed as advisor to BAPPENAS (1983–98) and presidential economic advisor 
(1993–98), while working as professor of economics at UI from 1964 to 1993.
2) Ali Wardhana (UI; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley) was professor of economics at UI. 
From 1966 to 1968, he was a member of the Economic Advisory Team of the President, served as 
Minister of Finance from 1973 to 1983, and replaced Widjojo as Menko from 1983 to 1988.
3) Emil Salim (UI; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley) served as Deputy Chief of BAPPENAS 
(1967–71), State Minister for State Apparatus (1971–73), Minister of Transportation, Communica-
tion and Tourism (1973–78), State Minister for Development Supervision and Environment (1978–
83), and Minister of State for Population and Environment (1983–93).
4) Subroto (UI; Ph.D., University of Indonesia) served as Director General of Research and Develop-
ment at the Department of Trade, Minister of Manpower, Resettlement and Cooperatives, and 
finally Minister of Mining and Energy (1983–88) before becoming Secretary General of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, in 1988.
5) Mohammad Sadli (UI; Ph.D., University of Indonesia) studied at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and the University of California, Berkeley, and served as Minister of Manpower 
(1971–73) and Minister of Mining and Energy (1973–78).
6) J. B. Sumarlin, a UI graduate, who obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh started his 
technocratic career as deputy chairman for fiscal and monetary matters at BAPPENAS (1970–73), 
then served as Vice Chairman of BAPPENAS (1973–82) and State Minister for State Apparatus 
(1973–83); as State Minister for National Development Planning as well as BAPPENAS Chairman 
(1983–88); and finally Minister of Finance (1988–93).
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Minister for State Apparatus and Deputy Chairman of BAPPENAS (1983–88), State 
Minister for National Development Planning and Chairman of BAPPENAS (1988–93) 
and Menko (1993–98);7) Adrianus Mooy as BI (Bank Indonesia) Governor (1988–93);8) 
Rachmat Saleh as BI Governor (1973–83) and Trade Minister (1983–88);9) Arifin Siregar 
as BI Governor (1983–88) and Trade Minister (1988–93);10) Soedradjad Djiwandono as 
BI Governor (1993–98).11)
As their careers show, four of the first-generation technocrats studied at the 
 University of California, Berkeley, and three of them obtained their Ph.Ds there, hence 
the group appellation “Berkeley Mafia.”  But a more appropriate label for the technocrats 
under Soeharto should have been the “UI-Gadjah Mada Mafia” because many of the 
technocrats who followed their footsteps were either trained at the UI or Gadjah Mada 
University, which would serve as the nesting grounds for grooming the technocrats who 
succeeded the original five.
In the early years of the New Order, technocrats were instrumental in setting the 
principles that informed the macro-economic policy framework under Soeharto: the 
7) Saleh Afif, another UI graduate, obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Oregon and started his 
technocratic career as State Minister for State Apparatus and Deputy Chairman of BAPPENAS 
(1983–88) before being appointed State Minister for National Development Planning and Chairman 
of BAPPENAS (1988–93) and finally Menko (1993–98).
8) Adrianus Mooy was a Gadjah Mada graduate, and had a Ph.D. in Econometrics from the University 
of Wisconsin.  He joined BAPPENAS in 1967, and rose up the BAPPENAS hierarchy, serving as 
Bureau Chief for Domestic Finance, Assistant to the Minister for Development Planning/BAP-
PENAS, and Deputy Chairman for Fiscal and Monetary Affairs (1983–88) before being appointed 
BI Governor (1988–93).
9) Rachmat Saleh, a UI graduate, joined the BI and climbed the central bank hierarchy as Represent-
ative of BI in New York in 1956; Secretary to the Board of Directors of BI in 1958; Head of Research, 
and later Vice Director of BI, in 1961; Director of BI, 1964; and Chairman of the Directorate of 
Foreign Exchange Institute, Jakarta, in 1968; BI Governor (1973–83) before being appointed Trade 
Minister (1983–88).
10) Arifin Siregar graduated from the Netherlands School of Economics, Rotterdam, in 1956; got his 
Ph.D. from the University of Muenster, West Germany, in 1960; then worked as Economic Affairs 
Officer in the United Nations Bureau of General Economic Research and Policies in New York in 
1961 and the United Nations Economic and Social Office, Beirut, in 1963.  He was an Economist at 
the Asian Development, IMF, in 1965 and a representative of the IMF in Laos (1969–71), then joined 
the BI as Director in 1971, served as Alternate Governor of the IMF in Indonesia (1973–83) and 
finally as BI Governor (1983–88) before being appointed Trade Minister.
11) Soedradjad Djiwandono, BI Governor (1993–98), was a graduate of Gadjah Mada (1963) and had a 
Ph.D. from Boston University (1980).  Married with a daughter of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the 
founder of the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, he joined the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) as a staff member of the Director General for Monetary Affairs in 1964, rose to Junior 
 Minister for Trade (1988–93) under Arifin Siregar, and was subsequently appointed BI Governor 
in 1993.
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 balanced budget, the open capital account, and the pegged exchange rate system.  The 
balanced budget principle and its international institutional framework, IGGI/CGI, 
served as a mechanism to keep total public expenditures under domestic government 
revenues plus official capital inflows.12)  It was instrumental in keeping the government 
from resorting to deficit financing and served to shield the Minister of Finance from 
excessive financing demands (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 13–14).  It also func-
tioned to prevent the government from attempting to raise funds by issuing domestic 
government bonds (and indeed, the government did not issue domestic bonds until the 
1997 crisis).  But it was never made into a law.  It essentially depended on the ability of 
the Finance Minister to persuade the President to reject proposals that required excess 
expenditure.  The government also relied on off-budget expenditures, the size of which 
was often unknown even to senior policy-makers.  Over time, the government increas-
ingly resorted to off-budget accounts to fund numerous pet projects (such as the state 
aircraft industry and Krakatau Steel), finance government election campaigns, and 
underwrite persistent public enterprise sector deficits by borrowing from state banks 
(ibid.).
The second principle—the open capital account—was introduced in 1971, when the 
government eliminated controls on foreign exchange transactions, most notably capital 
flows.  The open capital account was meant to provide a further brake on monetary 
policy by ensuring that any monetary mismanagement would show up almost immediately 
in an outflow of foreign exchange.  And finally, an adjustable pegged exchange rate (the 
third principle) was meant to maintain the real international value of the rupiah by adjust-
ing the nominal rate to reflect changes in domestic consumer prices relative to the 
international prices of its major trading partners (ibid.).
Technocrats, enjoying Soeharto’s trust and armed with the three principles, proved 
effective in the economic policy-making as long as the president supported them.  They 
formulated broad economic policies collectively.  A good example is monetary policy. 
Under the New Order, the BI was not independent.  Central Bank Law No. 13, 1968 
(Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 13 of 1968 concerning the Central Bank) 
explicitly stated that BI implement monetary policy formulated by the Monetary Board. 
The board was composed of the Finance Minister, Minister of Trade and Industry, State 
Secretary, government Economic Advisers (Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, that 
is), and the Governor of BI.  Policy recommendations and decisions as well as their 
implementation were in due course reported and discussed with the President.  Decisions 
12) IGGI (Inter-Government Group for Indonesia) was established in 1966 and was succeeded by the 
CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) in 1992 as an international framework for consultation to 
provide concessionary loans to the Indonesian government.
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were generally made after going through him.  Sometimes decisions were made for 
immediate implementation.  Otherwise, they went through Cabinet meetings, which 
were conducted once a month (Djiwandono 2004, 46).
But the above technocrats only represented one school of thought on Indonesia’s 
economic development.  They adhered to the doctrine of free trade and advocated limit-
ing state intervention in the market to a minimum and guaranteeing as much as possible 
the free economic activities of the private sector.  They also hewed to the notion of 
“comparative advantage” of a country for economic development.  Another school of 
thought—mainly represented by engineers, many of whom were trained at the Bandung 
Institute of Technology (ITB)—believed in industrial policy and upheld state-led eco-
nomic nationalism, arguing that the state should actively intervene to promote long-term 
growth of domestic industries, if necessary shielding these domestic industries from 
outside competition.
Officials representing these two opposing camps sought Soeharto’s support and 
blessings.  Indonesia’s development strategies oscillated between the two schools of 
thought as Soeharto oscillated between the two strategies.  When the economy was 
booming, economic nationalism manifested itself in the form of large-scale capital- 
intensive state projects, which often turned out to be wasteful and served to increase 
Indonesia’s external debt.  When the economy experienced a downturn, those projects 
were shelved, the exchange rate was devalued, and deregulations were introduced to 
integrate the Indonesian economy more deeply into the global market.
BAPPENAS was the stronghold of technocrats with the physical presence, either 
formal or informal, of Widjojo Nitisastro, while the nationalist school was represented 
by such high-ranking officials as B. J. Habibie, who served as State Minister for Science 
and Technology and Chief of Technology Assessment and Application Agency (Badan 
 Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi, BPPT) from 1983 to 1998; Ginandjar Kartasasmita 
who served as Junior Minister for the Promotion of Domestic Products (1983–88), Head 
of the Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, BKPM) 
(1985–88), Minister of Mining and Energy (1988–93), and State Minister for National 
Development Planning and Chief of BAPPENAS (1993–98); Hartarto, Minister of 
 Industry (1988–93); and Tunky Ariwibowo, Minister of Industry (1993–95) and Minister 
of Industry and Trade (1995–97).  Rent-seekers with vested interests, above all presi-
dential cronies and, increasingly, Soeharto’s family members, openly allied themselves 
with the nationalist school.
Technocrats had their heyday in the mid- to late 1980s.  One contentious issue 
between technocrats and nationalists was import controls.  In 1982, an “approved traders” 
system was introduced.  The system established a list of categories of raw materials, 
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components, and products that could be imported only by specified agencies.  By early 
1986, 1,484 items were under import license controls and 296 items were under phys-
ical import quotas.  These items amounted to USD2.7 billion worth of imports in 1985, 
representing more than half the value of Indonesia’s total imports.  These controls did 
little to protect local industries, and functioned more as a means of generating income 
for the president’s family and friends (Bresnan 1993, 247, 249).  Another issue was con-
trols on private investment.  Foreign investment was tightly controlled; from 1974 
onward, the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) issued comprehensive guidelines 
every year listing the priority areas for investment.  Under the leadership of Ginandjar 
Kartasasmita, the 1985 investment priority list, for instance, included 400 projects which 
were open to foreign investors, others which were restricted to domestic investors, and 
areas that were closed to investment altogether (ibid., 251).
But oil revenues were declining because of the collapse of oil prices in the early 
1980s.  The Fourth Five-Year Plan, announced in 1984, made it clear that the days of 
state-funded projects were over.  The Plan estimated that the economy would have to 
create nine million new jobs over the five-year period; this in turn would require the 
investment of Rp145.2 trillion, but the government budget would only be able to provide 
around half of that amount.  The remainder, Rp67.5 trillion, would have to come from the 
private sector and state enterprises.  Both the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 
Gen.  Benny Murdani and the State Secretary and Chairman of the government’s party, 
Golongan Karya (Golkar) Lt. Gen. Suhdarmono—Soeharto’s two top lieutenants in those 
days—called on ethnic Chinese businessmen to support the Plan by calling for the end 
of racial discrimination in government policies (ibid., 254–255).
With this broad political backing, technocrats took initiatives toward deregulation 
from 1983 to 1989.  The economic team which retained control over the major economic 
portfolios took steps to reform the financial system, adopted a more open trade stance, 
and introduced a modern tax system (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 17).  Soeharto 
took his economic ministers’ advice, as he had on earlier occasions when resources were 
constrained.  Menko Ali Wardhana and his economic ministers proceeded with their 
reforms when they had the formal authority, bureaucratic strength, political backing, and 
Soeharto’s personal support to act on such issues as trade, investment, exchange rates, 
interest rates, and taxes.  The incremental approach included bank reforms in 1983; a 
tax reform at the end of that year; reform of the customs service in 1985; the devalua-
tion of the rupiah in 1986; and partial trade reforms in 1986 and 1987.  Investment 
controls were eased in 1986 and 1987, and in 1988 a package of deregulation measures 
in trade and customs was announced by Radius Prawiro, the new Menko (Bresnan 1993, 
262–263).
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But technocrats had lost their momentum and political support by the early 1990s. 
In the 1993 reshuffle, most of the technocrats were replaced by economic nationalists 
and bureaucrats (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 17–18).  This was in part because of 
the rise of nationalists led by Habibie and Ginandjar and in part because of the rise of a 
new breed of career bureaucrats who were able to obtain technical expertise by doing 
graduate work abroad (technocratic bureaucrats) and who were often supported by 
 Soeharto and his family members and cronies.
Mar’ie Muhammad13) replaced J. B. Sumarlin as Finance Minister; Ginandjar 
 Kartasasmita14) replaced Saleh Afif as State Minister for National Development Planning 
and BAPPENAS Chief; S. B. Joedono,15) Habibie’s ally, replaced Arifin Siregar as Trade 
Minister; while one of two remaining technocrats, Saleh Afif, was appointed as Menko 
to replace Radius Prawiro16) and another, Soedradjad Djiwandono, replaced Adrianus 
Mooy as BI Governor.
It is also important to note that the Indonesian economy was undergoing major 
changes by the early 1990s.  The private sector emerged as the driving force for economic 
growth.  There was a general surge in foreign direct investment after the 1985 Plaza 
13) Mar’ie Muhammad, a UI Accounting graduate with an Islamic activist background, joined the MOF 
in 1970 and rose in the Finance bureaucracy to serve, from 1988–93, as Director General of Taxes 
before being appointed as Minister of Finance from 1993–98.  Soeharto gave him the finance port-
folio because he had known him since his student activist days and because he was impressed by 
his performance as the clean and forceful Director General of Taxes.
14) Ginandjar Kartasasmita, a Chemical Engineer graduate of the Tokyo University for Agriculture and 
Technology (1960–65), rose in the state secretariat bureaucracy from the G-5 of the Supreme Com-
mand as one of future Vice President Sudharmono’s lieutenants in the early days of New Order to 
Junior Minister for the Promotion of Domestic Products from 1965–83.  He then served as Chief of 
the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) from 1985–88; as Minister of Energy from 1988–93; 
and finally as State Minister for National Development Planning and Chief of BAPPENAS from 
1993–98.  He was given the job of the BAPPENAS chief in part because he enjoyed the presidential 
trust and in part because he was acceptable to B. J. Habibie who was intent on increasing his bureau-
cratic power at the expense of the technocrats.
15) Satrio Budihardjo Joedono was born on December 1, 1940 in Pangkalpinang, Bangka.  A graduate 
of UI (Economics), he obtained his Ph.D. in Public Administration from the State University of New 
York, Albany.  While teaching at UI (promoted to professor in 1987) and serving as director of the 
Institute for Economic and Social Research (1970–78) and Dean of the Faculty of Economics (1978–
82), he also served as assistant to the Minister of Trade (1970–73) and to the Minister of Research 
(1973–78), Assistant Minister of Research and Technology (1978–82 and 1986–88) and Assistant 
Minister for Industry and Energy (1988–93) before being appointed as Minister of Trade (1993–95). 
Known to be incorruptible, he was elected Chairman of the Board of Audit, 1998–2003.
16) Radius Prawiro, a graduate of the Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool (The Netherlands Eco-
nomic High School), obtained his Ph.D. from the UI.  He began his technocratic career as Governor 
of BI (1966–73), and served as Minister of Trade in 1973–83, Minister of Finance (1983–88), and 
finally Menko (1988–93).
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Accord as realized foreign investment rose from USD0.3 billion in 1985 to USD4.3 billion 
in 1995.  Most notable was the shift in the ratio of non-oil and gas revenue receipts as a 
proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which rose from slightly more than 
8% in 1985–86 to nearly 12% in 1994–95 (ibid., 19, 22).  But attempts at curbing vested 
interests were not very successful.  As Menko, Saleh Afif knew that eliminating or even 
reducing the monopolies Soeharto’s cronies controlled would be impossible.  Protection-
ism also reared its head in the form of Soeharto’s son’s national car project, which began 
in 1996 and was routinely ridiculed as the “family car project.”
But most important was the fact that as private capital flows increased in the 1990s, 
the government found it increasingly difficult to manage the exchange rate regime.  The 
BI purchased foreign currencies to manage increasingly large capital inflows and to 
prevent an appreciation of the rupiah, thereby increasing the money supply and forcing 
the BI to offer higher Certificates of Deposit rates to raise interest rates, which in turn 
invited more private capital inflows under the pegged exchange rate regime.  As the 
economy overheated and the real exchange rate appreciated, imports grew rapidly 
while exports slowed down.  Though the government took steps to reduce domestic 
demand, it failed to address the issue of export growth.  As a result, the growing trade 
imbalance and Indonesia’s debt, above all short-term private debt, began to rise sig-
nificantly.  The BI widened the intervention bands around the pegged exchange rate 
in a belated effort to introduce more flexibility into the foreign exchange market and to 
warn offshore borrowers that they were taking considerable foreign exchange risks that 
had to be covered.  But widening the bands was immediately followed by pressures that 
drove the exchange rate to the appreciation edge of the band.  Serious concerns were 
also raised when it became known that the president’s cronies and family members were 
using state banks to obtain foreign funds for a range of large investment projects since 
such borrowings were assumed to have a measure of sovereign guarantee.  In short, 
adherence to the exchange rate regime in place led in the 1990s to significant and large 
unhedged foreign exchange exposure by many Indonesian companies.  Eventually, 
widespread bankruptcies would follow when the exchange rate regime collapsed in 
1997–98.
Technocrats in Crisis
The implicit inconsistency between the open capital account policy and the reliance on 
a pegged exchange rate was exposed when the economic crisis started in Thailand and 
spread to Indonesia (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 17, 34–35).  Technocrats initially 
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believed that Indonesia’s economic fundamentals were sound and viewed the crisis as 
containable.17)  They in fact characterized it as a “mini crisis” that could be used to redress 
long-term structural problems which had not been addressed after the deregulations lost 
steam in the early 1990s.  Between 1989 and 1996, real GDP growth averaged 8%; the 
overall fiscal balance remained in surplus after 1992; public debt as a share of GDP fell; 
and inflation hovered near 10%.  Confident of Indonesia’s sound economic fundamentals, 
technocrats seized the opportunity to persuade Soeharto to introduce structural reforms 
as they deemed fit and to address structural problems such as expanding bad loans in the 
banking sector, the dependence of business groups on short-term dollar-denominated 
funds from foreign sources, and the control of Soeharto’s children, lieutenants, and crony 
business tycoons over commanding heights of the Indonesian economy.
The government abandoned its long-standing crawling peg exchange rate regime 
on August 1, 1997; in September, the government announced 10 policy measures, which 
technocrats named their own IMF conditionality, calling for financial and fiscal tightening 
and structural reforms, including the suspension of government development projects 
and banking sector reforms, i.e., bailing out healthy banks which faced temporary liquid-
ity difficulties, merging unhealthy banks with other banks, or else liquidating them 
 (Shiraishi 2005, 33; Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 48).18)
Yet the rupiah kept going down; by early September 1997, it plunged below the 
symbolic USD1:Rp3,000 line.  On October 8, Widjojo persuaded Soeharto to ask for 
assistance from the IMF.  The President appointed Widjojo Nitisastro to head the eco-
17) What Djiwandono has to say in his memoirs is instructive.  He writes: “A question that I kept being 
asked was, if our fundamentals were strong how come Indonesia suffered so much?  To shed some 
light on this issue, I like to think that there is a different perception about what constitutes the 
macro fundamentals of an economy.  I would argue that at least until the Asian crisis, macroecono-
mists generally thought about growth of national products, exports, current accounts, inflation rates, 
unemployment rates and several other macro indicators every time they talked about economic 
fundamentals.  I would even argue that, in general, macroeconomists did not include the state of 
the banking sector as an important item in economic fundamentals.  Banking issues have tradition-
ally been treated as microeconomics. . . . In other words, in a macro-economic analysis, the workings 
and soundness of the banking sector had been assumed to be present or taken for granted” 
 (Djiwandono 2004, 28).
18) Djiwandono says about the bank closure as follows: he went to President Soeharto to propose clos-
ing seven small commercial banks as a first step in December 1996.  But the President did not 
approve the proposal and instructed Djiwandono to finalize a government decree to regulate bank 
closure.  It was issued at the end of 1996 as Government Decree No. 68, 1996.  In April 1997, he 
went back to the President with the proposal to close the seven banks once again.  This time he 
approved it, but asked him to postpone execution until after the 1997 general election and the 
general assembly of the People’s Consultative Assembly in March 1998.  The financial crisis began 
in July 1997 (Djiwandono 2004, 128).
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nomic team to make the necessary preparations to notify the IMF (Djiwandono 2004, 
63).  The team was composed of members of the Monetary Board—Minister of Finance 
Mar’ie Muhammad, Minister of Trade and Industry Tungky Ariwibowo, State Secretary 
Moerdiono, Economic Advisors Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, and BI Governor 
Soedradjad Djiwandono.  Interestingly, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, BAPPENAS Chief, was 
not included in the team.  A small team who negotiated the program in details assisted 
the team, which was composed of Director General of Financial Institutions (MOF) 
 Bambang Subianto, BI Managing Director Boediono, and Assistant to Coordinating 
 Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs Djunaedi Hadisumarto.
In November 1997, the government signed the letter of intent (LOI) with the IMF. 
The President was well aware of the essence of the program.  But Soedradjad Djiwandono 
tells us in his memoirs that whether the program should be precautionary or stand-by 
was never brought up in discussions between the economic team and the President. 
After the signing of the first LOI, BI Governor proposed at an economic team meeting 
that the team should explain the details of the program, including the meaning of first 
and second line of defense and the issue of conditionality, to the President.  But Widjojo 
Nitisastro, the chairman of the team, decided to wait for a better moment.  This never 
happened (ibid., 72).
The November 1997 LOI was based on the assumption that the crisis was essentially 
a moderate case of contagion and overshooting of the exchange rate.  The program was 
thus designed for such a mild crisis (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 49).  But the LOI 
required every structural and bureaucratic reform that were deemed good for Indonesia. 
Both technocrats and the IMF wanted to use the crisis to achieve what Indonesian tech-
nocrats had worked for.  Taking over the broad reform agenda without fully appreciating 
what the reforms entailed, what political and social changes they implied, and the capac-
ity of the government to manage such rapid economic change, the team and the IMF not 
only weakened the focus of its own agenda but in the end undermined the political struc-
ture that had evolved under Soeharto over 40 years (ibid., 109).19)
The structural reforms required by IMF not only threatened to hurt the business 
interests of Soeharto’s children, his crony business tycoons, and his lieutenants, but also 
worked to undermine Soeharto’s huge patronage networks and the informal funding 
19) It is useful to note what Djiwandono has to say about the conditionality and the bank closure.  He 
writes on the IMF conditionality that “my instincts told me then that our government would not be 
able to fulfill the stringent conditionality that went with the stand-by arrangement” (Djiwandono 
2004, 64).  He also tells us about the bank closure as follows: “I was comfortable about liquidating 
the seven banks with the President’s approval.  However, I had to admit that liquidating more than 
twice the number of banks really scared me” (ibid., 130).
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mechanisms of state agencies (including the military).  When the government closed 16 
troubled banks and suspended government development projects right after it signed the 
agreement with the IMF, Soeharto learned that he was duped.  He allowed his son to 
take over another bank and revived government development projects the government 
had suspended and which were controlled by his family and crony businesses.  The 
 closure of banks also triggered a bank run and led to a systemic crisis in the banking 
sector.
Technocrats’ attempt to correct the “distortions” of cronyism backfired because 
they failed to understand the huge political significance and functions of patronage under 
the New Order.  In trying to rein in the activities of Soeharto’s children as well as cronies, 
the technocrats not only antagonized their President, but unwittingly triggered a crisis 
in an already jittery market.  Bank closures, rather than addressing the question of 
unhealthy banks, had the opposite effect, undermining confidence in all private banks and 
precipitating an open political confrontation between the presidential family and the 
 Minister of Finance and BI Governor.  The presidential family won the battle.  But the 
price paid was high: the market confidence in the government will in complying with the 
IMF conditionality was deeply undermined, while technocrats lost the presidential 
 confidence.
The most contentious issue between the President and the economic team was the 
question of liquidity.  The BI had to deal with banks that suffered from bank runs, but 
adding liquidity into the banking sector could jeopardize the efforts to strengthen the 
rupiah and possibly violate IMF conditionality.  The BI thus found itself in between the 
two opposing camps.  “On the one hand, the President mounted pressure for easing 
liquidity to help the weakening real sectors.  On the other hand, the Fund (IMF) kept 
reminding BI of the need to keep interest rates high to defend the rupiah as agreed upon 
in the LOI” (Djiwandono 2004, 99).  Besides, the President instructed state banks to start 
lending to small and medium scale enterprises with subsidized rates of interest.  To make 
things worse, this scheme was designed by the President and some Cabinet ministers 
and senior officials of several ministries without consulting either the Governor of BI or 
the Ministry of Finance (ibid., 112–113).  Soedradjad Djiwandono asked for the presiden-
tial approval to raise the interest rate in compliance with the LOI, but he never got it 
(ibid., 113).  Instead the President instructed the BI to inject liquidity into the troubled 
banks and loosen monetary controls.  The resulting sharp increase in liquidity support 
from the last quarter of 1997 to 1998 spurred further deterioration of the macro-economic 
situation and increasingly strained the relationship between the government and the IMF 
(Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 95).  Sino-Indonesian businesses benefited the most 
from the liquidity support.  A 2000 study by the Supreme Audit Agency (Badan Peneriksi 
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Keuangan) claimed that around Rp138 trillion of the BLBI funds issued was misused 
between 1997–98 (ibid., 96).
Then, in December 1997, Soeharto fell seriously ill and did not attend the ASEAN 
summit meeting.  This instantly transformed the economic crisis into a political crisis. 
Conflict manifested itself again between the government and the IMF in January 1998 
when the government announced a draft budget with no surplus, in spite of the IMF 
requirement of a 1.3% GDP surplus in the November agreement.  The draft budget was 
also criticized for its “unrealistic” tax revenue and exchange rate assumptions.  In 
reaction, the rupiah plummeted by 70%, reaching 10,000 rupiah per dollar.  Another 
round of negotiations between the government and the IMF began.  This time, though, 
it was Soeharto himself, and not the technocrats, who took charge of the negotiations 
with IMF representative Stanley Fisher (ibid., 51)—another sign that the President 
had lost faith in his economic team.  To compound the matter, Soeharto pointedly chose 
not to invite the Minister of Finance and the Governor of BI to the official signing of 
the LOI.
By that time, US high officials began to see Soeharto as part of the problem.   Soeharto 
understood this very well and wanted to wage what he called “guerrilla warfare.”  He let 
the IMF spell out all the structural reform measures it wanted (which amounted to over 
100) without any intention of abiding by the conditionality (Shiraishi 2005, 24; Ginandjar 
and Stern forthcoming, 53).  Soeharto also entertained the possibility of introducing a 
currency board system as a solution to the crisis, calling it “IMF plus”; this was supported 
by some officials in the MOF (Ginandjar and Stern forthcoming, 52).  Japan and the United 
States, however, were alarmed since the ill-timed introduction of a currency board system 
would instantly deplete Indonesia’s foreign currency reserves and devastate the Indone-
sian economy while providing Soeharto’s children and cronies with a small window of 
opportunity for bailout.  BI Governor Soedradjad Djiwandono opposed the idea and was 
dismissed in February 1998.20)  In a few weeks, Deputy Governor of the BI, Boediono, 
was also dismissed.21)  Ginandjar writes: “For a time it seemed that Finance Minister 
Mar’ie Muhammad would be headed for a similar fate but he survived for reasons that 
may never be known” (ibid., 101).
20) To be precise Soedradjad Djiwandono never opposed a CBS because he was afraid to publicly air 
his difference with the President on the matter.  But he says he also knew that being vague was the 
best technique in that peculiar environment to send a message to the President that he did not 
support the CBS scheme (Djiwandono 2004, 9, 19).
21) In fact all the BI managing directors except one, Syahril Sabirin, were dismissed before their terms 
ended (Djiwandono 2004, 3).  This untimely dismissal demonstrated his intention to the public that 
he would punish any official for violating his unwritten rule not to embarrass his family (ibid., 12).
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With the economic team in disarray, Japan and the United States intervened. 
 President Clinton sent former Vice President Walter Mondale in March 1998 to dis-
suade Soeharto from introducing a currency board system.  Suspicious of US intentions, 
however, Soeharto was in no mood to listen to the US envoy.  The meeting was cut 
short when Soeharto rejected Mondale’s suggestion about the need for “political 
reform.”  Shortly thereafter, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Indo-
nesia, met with Soeharto, persuaded him not to introduce the currency board system, 
and opened the way for yet another IMF rescue package, which was to be agreed on in 
April 1998.
In the meantime, Soeharto was re-elected president once again on March 11, 1998, 
with B. J. Habibie as his vice president.  The positions of Menko and BAPPENAS chief 
were held by Ginandjar Kartasasmita.  Fuad Bawazir,22) who was known to be close to 
Soeharto’s children and in favor of introducing a currency board system, was appointed 
as the Minister of Finance, while Syahril Sabirin,23) the only survivor of the BI massacre 
and in support of a currency board system, had replaced Djiwandono as BI Governor. 
The new cabinet thus further reduced the role of technocrats with some ministers 
becoming closely identified with the presidential family.
After his re-election, Soeharto established the Economic Stabilization Council with 
Menko Ginandjar Kartasasmita as its executive chairman.  Ginandjar promptly set as his 
top priority the need to repair relations with the international community and regain 
market confidence.  The committee also had Anthony Salim, the son of Indonesian 
 Chinese business tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, as Secretary General (ibid., 55–58).  He also 
regularly consulted with Widjojo.
Ginandjar was in charge of negotiations with foreign governments and the IMF.  His 
counterparts were the so-called “Three Musketeers”: US Treasury Undersecretary for 
International Affairs, David Lipton; Japanese Vice Minister for International Finance, 
Eisuke Sakakibara; and German Director General of International Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance, Klaus Regling.  The committee decided to abandon the currency board scheme, 
22) Fuad Bawazir who is of Arab descent and a Gadjah Mada graduate with a Ph.D. from the University 
of Maryland rose in the MOF hierarchy.  Similar to Mar’ie Mohammad, he had an Islamic activist 
background and granted favors to Soeharto’s family members while he was Director General of 
Taxes before he was appointed the Minister of Finance.
23) Syahril Sabirin, a graduate of Gadjah Mada University (1968), obtained his Ph.D. in 1979 from 
Vanderbilt University.  From 1969 to 1993, he worked at the BI, rising in the bank hierarchy and 
serving as section chief for current account (1982–83) and for bank development (1982–84), bureau 
chief of economics and statistics (1985–87) and of clearing (1987–88), and director (1988–93).  He 
was senior financial economist at the WB (1993–96) before returning to BI as director (1997–98), 
and finally as governor (1998–2003).
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reestablished dialogue with the IMF, and concluded a new LOI two weeks after the new 
cabinet was formed.  Ginandjar states that all the programs resulting from the negotia-
tions were embraced by the Indonesian economic team as its own.  All the government 
departments were given specific and written instructions by the Menko to carry out 
reforms within their areas of responsibilities and to abide by the timetable (ibid., 56–57).
But it was too late.  By then Soeharto’s politics of stability and economic develop-
ment had been thoroughly discredited.  Its collapse was triggered by the fuel price 
increase in May 1998.  Following massive riots in May in Jakarta and elsewhere, Soeharto 
resigned.  The New Order came to an end.
The Remaking of Indonesian Technocracy
B. J. Habibie succeeded to the presidency according to constitutional stipulation.  He had 
a weak presidential mandate and power base.  He chose to present himself as a reformer, 
initiating measures in the name of reformasi, which eventually led to the transformation 
of the Indonesian political system from developmental authoritarianism into decentralized 
democracy.
The basic shape of the post-Soeharto regime was defined by the constitutional revi-
sions and new laws introduced over the transitional period under Presidents Habibie 
(May 1998–October 1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999–July 2002), and 
 Megawati Sukarnoputri (July 2002–October 2004).  These constitutional revisions—
which took place incrementally from 1998 to 2003—reformulated the relationship among 
the three branches of government in terms of the division of powers.  The President and 
the Vice President, formerly elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
 Permusyawaratan Rakyat, hereinafter MPR), are now to be elected directly; the legisla-
ture is to consist of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), the Council of People’s 
 Representatives and the newly created DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), the Council 
of Local Representatives; and the MPR, the highest decision-making body under  Soeharto 
which saw the peak of its power in the transitional years under B. J. Habibie and 
 Abdurrahman Wahid, lost much of its powers.  While Soeharto controlled the MPR 
through direct and indirect appointment of its majority members and by extension all the 
government organs, constitutional revisions in the post-Soeharto era have created a 
division of powers in which the presidency has to share power with a parliament whose 
members are directly elected and in which political parties dominate.  Elections, both 
parliamentary and presidential, are to be held every five years and define the national 
political calendar.  Though still powerful with its own sphere of influence and interests 
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curved out in the name of national unity and security, the army no longer dominates 
politics.  The military doctrine of dual functions was scrapped and military officers were 
withdrawn from the civilian arm of the state.  New defense and police laws were enacted. 
The army domination over the military establishment came to an end.  Navy and air force 
officers serve as a military chief in rotation with army officers.  The police was separated 
from the military (Matsui and Kawamura, 2005, 75–99; Honna, 2013).
Free and fair parliamentary elections were held in 1999, 2004, and 2009.  The first 
direct presidential election, which brought the current president Susilo Bambang 
 Yudhoyono to power, took place in July and October 2004.  The second presidential elec-
tion brought the incumbent back the second term in 2009.  Democratization has also 
gone hand in hand with decentralization.  New laws on local autonomy and local finance 
in 1999 have created local governments which are no longer accountable to the central 
government but answer to the local parliament.  While Soeharto could in effect appoint 
provincial governors, district chiefs, and mayors, the central government now has to 
share powers with local governments.  More powers and resources have been devolved 
to local governments, above all district and municipality governments at the expense 
of—and often in tension with—the central and the provincial government.  An increasing 
proportion of central government budget has been allocated to local governments: from 
19.3% in 2001 to 30.7% in 2005, when direct elections of local chiefs started, to 33.9% 
in 2007.  Expanded authority combined with guaranteed and increasing resource alloca-
tion to the local governments created incentives for local groups to create more local 
governments and to control such governments with their own men.  The number of 
districts and municipalities increased from 311 in 1998 to 478 in 2008 while the number 
of provinces expanded from 27 in 1998 to 41 in 2008.  Parties formed coalitions to con-
trol local governments, the composition of a governing coalition different from one local-
ity to another, some being made up with only nationalist parties or Islamic and Islamist 
parties, but more often combining both nationalist and Islamic and Islamist parties 
 (Okamoto 2010).
In democratic politics, the DPR, the lower house of the parliament, has emerged as 
a new power center along with the presidency and the military, and electoral politics has 
assumed a crucial role in organizing the government.  Yet no single party controls the 
parliament.  A party or two may emerge or disappear every election, but the multiparty 
system will remain with no single party controlling the parliament, as long as the 
 current electoral system stays and deep social divisions along religious (pious Muslims 
vs. statistical Muslims and non-Muslims, traditionalist vs. modernist Muslims), ethnic, 
and class lines inform party divisions.  It is not easy for any president to organize any 
cabinet to work as a team because a “team” composed of technocrats, professionals, 
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military officers, bureaucrats, and politicians from different parties needs to be cobbled 
together not only for the business of governing but also for achieving a majority in the 
parliament.
This is evident in all the teams assembled by the successive Presidents.  Instru-
mental in checkmating Soeharto in his final days, Ginandjar Kartasasmita emerged as a 
key player in the Habibie government, along with the President himself and General 
Wiranto, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Defense Minister.  Ginandjar, 
not Habibie, assembled his economic team as Menko, including Boediono24) (formerly 
Ginandjar’s deputy for macro-economic affairs at BAPPENAS before his transfer to the 
BI) as BAPPENAS Chief and State Minister for National Development Planning, 
 Bambang Subianto25) as Minister of Finance (appointed at Widjojo’s recommendation), 
and Syahril Sabirin as BI Governor.  The arrival of Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth 
President marked a clear break with the New Order past.  Elected as an outcome of back 
room dealings among political party bosses in the MPR, his cabinet was dominated by 
party politicians: out of 35 cabinet ministers in his first cabinet, 22 were party politicians 
while 6 were retired military officers and 4 career bureaucrats; in the second cabinet, 11 
party politicians, 4 military officers, 6 career bureaucrats in the 26 member cabinet.  Kwik 
Kian Gie,26) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
 Perjuangan, hereinafter PDI-P) politician and Vice President Megawati’s confidant, 
became Menko.  Bambang Sudibyo,27) Gadjah Mada accounting professor and a confident 
of National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) Chairman and People’s Consultative 
24) Boediono was trained abroad (B.A., University of Western Australia; M.A., Monash University; 
Ph.D., Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania) and served as deputy for fiscal and 
monetary affairs at BAPPENAS (1988–93) and Deputy Governor of the BI (1993–98) before being 
made State Minister for National Development Planning and BAPPENAS Chief in 1998.
25) Bambang Subianto, a graduate of Leuven Catholic University in Belgium, rose in the finance hier-
archy to become Director General of Monetary Affairs, and was appointed the first Chief of Indo-
nesian Bank Restructuring Agency, only to be dismissed by Soeharto after a few months.
26) Kwik Kian Gie, born in Juwana, Central Java, is of ethnic Chinese ancestry.  A graduate of the 
Nederlandse Economische Hogeschool (The Netherlands Economic High School) Rotterdam in 
1963, he worked as an investment company executive and joined the Indonesian Democratic Party 
(PDI).  He served as a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) from 1987 to 1992. 
He became the chief economic advisor to  Megawati Soekarnoputri after her election as the Chairman 
of PDI in 1994.  He headed the party’s research and development department until Megawati elected 
as Vice President before he was appointed as Menko under Abdurrahman Wahid.
27) Born in Temanggung, Central Java, on October 8, 1952, Bambang Sudibyo, a graduate of Gadjah 
Mada University and a Ph.D. (Business Administration) from the University of Kentucky (1985), 
spent most of his career at Gadjah Mada University.  He joined the National Mandate Party when 
it was established in 1998 and served as chairman of its Economic Council before he was appointed 
as Finance Minister under Abdurrahman Wahid.
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Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) General Chairman, Amien Rais, 
was appointed Finance Minister.  Djunaedi Hadisumarto,28) inheriting the technocratic 
 mantle, served as Chairman of BAPPENAS, but was not made State Minister for National 
Develop ment Planning.  Syahril Sabirin remained as BI Governor.  In the second 
 Abdurrahman Wahid cabinet, Rizal Ramli—a former student activist with the background 
in engineering who was sent by technocrats to do graduate work at Boston University, 
but who rebelled against his seniors by openly attacking technocracy and establishing his 
own business consultancy firm upon his return to Indonesia—became Menko, while 
Prijadi Praptosuhardjo, previously Bank Rakyat Indonesia director, became Finance 
 Minister.29)
Mindful of the fate of Abdurrahman Wahid whose administration was chaotic and 
who was eventually ousted from power in impeachment, Megawati was careful not to 
antagonize any party.  The Jakarta elite had also come to the agreement that political 
alliance alone would not suffice to lift Indonesia out of the mess and that Megawati needed 
“professionals” unbound by party politics.  She gave ministerial positions to party repre-
sentatives, but reserved some of the more important economic posts for non-partisan 
professionals and her confidants.  Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti,30) UI professor of political 
economy whom Soeharto in his final days sent to the United States as ambassador, was 
appointed Menko; Boediono Minister of Finance; and Kwik Kian Gie Minister of National 
Development Planning.  Burhanuddin Abdullah replaced Syahril Sabirin in 2003 as BI 
Governor.
By the time Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono came to power in 2004, Boediono had 
28) Under normal circumstances, Djunaedi Hadisumarto should have inherited the mantle from 
Boediono to serve as State Minister for National Development Planning and Chief of BAPPENAS. 
But Abdurrahman Wahid did not appoint any minister for national development planning.  Djunaedi, 
a UI graduate and UI professor of economics, had served as Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Transportation and Vice Chairman of BAPPENAS under Boediono before being promoted to Chair-
man of BAPPENAS.
29) Rizal Ramli, a graduate of the ITB and a student activist, obtained Ph.D. in economics from Boston 
University in 1990.  Upon completion of his graduate work, he established an economic research 
and publishing firm, Econit, and emerged as a critic of Soeharto’s crony Liem Sioe Liong, Freeport, 
and the IMF.  He served as Head of the National Logistic agency (Bulog) before he was appointed 
as Menko from 2000 to 2001.  Prijadi Praptosuhardjo, Abdurrahman Wahid confidant, is a graduate 
of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) where he studied fishery.  He spent his career in Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) where he became friends with Abdurrahman Wahid.  He was appointed as 
BRI director in 1992 but failed in his bid to become the bank president despite Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
recommendation.  Instead, he was appointed Minister of Finance.
30) Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, a UI Economics graduate, holds a Ph.D. (Political Economy) from the 
University of California at Berkeley, and was ambassador to the United States before being appointed 
as Menko under Megawati.
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restored the credentials of technocrats by his success in achieving macro-economic sta-
bility.  With his party controlling only 10% of the parliament, it was imperative for the 
President to gather a stable parliamentary majority.  He enlisted most of the political 
parties except Megawati’s PDI-P for the government coalition, while encouraging the 
Vice President to take over the Golkar leadership and destroying the opposition coalition 
of PDI-P and Akbar Tandjung-led Golkar.  But he paid a high price.  He gave almost one 
third of ministerial positions to party representatives in organizing his cabinet and allowed 
the Vice President to have a say in appointing economic team members, even though 
parties, including the Golkar, in the governing coalition do not hesitate exploiting oppor-
tunities to promote their own gains at the expense of the President and the government.
As mentioned earlier, the fact that the Indonesian economy did well under 
 Yudhoyono enhanced the stature of his Finance Minister Sri Mulyani and was a factor in 
his designation of BI Governor and former Menko Budiono as his running mate in the 
2009 presidential election.  Given the new division of powers and the effects of decen-
tralization on center-local relations, however, it is clear that the president can no longer 
preside over Indonesia’s political life in the way Soeharto had done before.  This was 
amply demonstrated recently when Sri Mulyani was sent off to the IMF in 2010 despite 
(or perhaps because of) her success as Finance Minister because her principled budget-
making angered many politicians, particularly Golkar boss Aburizal Bakrie, who demanded 
pork barrel funding.  Even a technocrat of her stature who has enjoyed good relations 
with the President can be politically expendable.
The government can take policy initiatives to address problems and policy issues 
only on the basis of an achieved national consensus.  But achieving a national consensus 
under the new democratic dispensation is a challenge precisely because the era of polit-
ical demobilization is over and various social forces are making themselves felt in politi-
cal processes.
There are important commonalities among those who now dominate local and 
national politics: the great majority of national and local parliamentary members are men, 
born in the areas they represent (putra daerah), highly-educated at least formally, with 
activist backgrounds in party, youth, and religious organizations (whether nationalist or 
Islamic), belong to Indonesia’s small but fast expanding middle classes, and are repre-
sented by business people, professionals, civil servants, school teachers, military and 
police officers, religious teachers, and journalists.  There are hardly any parliamentary 
members with peasant, labor, and urban poor backgrounds.
The implications are clear.  In national as well as local politics, local men with 
middle-class backgrounds dominate.  In part a product of Soeharto’s politics of stability 
and development, this emergent elite thrived under Soeharto, but now encompasses 
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formerly marginalized (but nonetheless middle-class) groups composed of journalists, 
school teachers, and religious leaders.  This elite shares in the belief that economic 
growth is the key to Indonesia’s future, and is in a position to make its belief a part of the 
national agenda, even though its members disagree on how to achieve growth and they 
do not shy away from calling for populist and protectionist measures in the name of 
welfare whenever those measures suit their political and economic interests.  In his 
election manifesto, Yudhoyono (2004) made the achievement of economic growth, along 
with maintaining national unity, central to his agenda.  The new system of decentralized 
democracy has also worked for him, despite its decisive curbing of the executive power 
of the presidency.
At the same time, however, decentralization has given real powers and resources 
to local governments, above all district chiefs and mayors.  To see how decentralization 
combined with democratization, above all direct elections of local chiefs worked, it is 
useful to examine two provinces with very different sets of social conditions, North 
Sumatra and Central Java (including the special region of Yogyakarta).
In North Sumatra, which is ethnically and religiously highly diverse (with 33% 
 Javanese, 16% Tananuli Bataks, 10% Toba Bataks, 8% Mandailing Bataks, 6% Nias, 5% 
Karo Bataks, 5% Malays, 3% Angkora Bataks as well as smaller minorities, while 65% 
Muslim, 27% Protestant, 5% Catholic, 3% Buddhist), the number of districts and mayor-
alty increased from 19 in 2000 to 26 in 2008 (BPS 2001a).  Seventeen small parties 
(which do not have members in the national parliament) along with seven national parties 
helped forge governing coalitions that differed in composition and membership from one 
district to another (on average, about 2.7 small parties in a coalition).  In 12 out of 26 
districts/municipalities, governing coalitions were made up with a combination of nation-
alist parties (PD, Golkar and/or PDI-P) and Islamic parties; only 4 districts/municipalities 
were controlled by Islamic/Islamist parties.
In Central Java which is ethnically and religiously homogeneous, with 98% Javanese 
and 96% Muslim, a different picture obtains (BPS 2001b).  The number of districts and 
municipalities has remained the same.  A smaller number (2.3 on average) of small par-
ties joined governing coalitions in smaller number of districts and municipalities (6 out 
of 40); in 18 out of 40, a coalition of nationalist parties (PD, Golkar and/or PDI-P) with 
Islamic and Islamist parties, while 6 districts and municipalities came under the govern-
ing coalition of Islamic and Islamist parties.
The implications should be clear enough.  In ethnically diverse North Sumatra, 
ethnic politics are now very much localized and contained in local politics because ethnic 
groups have ended up with creating their own local governments and/or joining govern-
ing coalitions.  Religious politics have also to some extent come to be contained locally 
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because the areas with a high concentration of pious Muslims now have Islamic/Islamist 
party coalition under which local governments introduce religious regulations to meet 
the demands of pious Muslims, while in other districts these religious issues remain 
muted because of the coalition that brings together both nationalist and Islamic/Islamist 
parties.
To put it simply, democratization and decentralization have “contained” ethnic and 
religious politics by localizing them.  Politics of identity, once suppressed by Soeharto, 
now thrives, but as a local issue, with some exceptions (such as pornography) flaring up 
occasionally.  “National” issues are now largely framed by, and very much tied to, a 
politics of economic growth, with the central government deriving its public support and 
electoral success from its perceived capacity to deliver economic growth, create jobs, 
reduce poverty, and keep inflation under control as we can see in Fig. 1.  The language 
of economic growth—a byproduct of economics as a discipline—is part of a discursive 
field in which technocrats claim expertise.  But the irony is that the elevation of this 
discourse of economic growth to the national agenda comes at a time when technocrats 
have become no more than technicians who are charged with “fixing” the economy while 
having no control or say over how politics, or more specifically the purpose of politics, is 
defined.  The transformation of technocracy and the changing conditions under which 
technocrats now work need to be located—and can only be understood—within this 
Fig. 1 Economic Performance and Public Ratings of the President and the Democratic Party
Source: Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) (2009).
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larger context of political and ideological transformation, rather than a simple question 
of economics and economic policy.
This is not to say that Indonesia did not undergo important institutional changes for 
the economic policy-making in these transitional years.  The Central Bank Law, enacted 
in 1999 under Habibie, guaranteed the independence of the BI from the government for 
the first time; and prohibited the BI from purchasing government domestic bonds.  BI’s 
independence was tested in 2000 when President Abdurrahman Wahid asked BI Gover-
nor Syahril Sabirin to resign while promising him other positions.  Syahril Sabirin refused 
to resign and was arrested and put in jail, but was subsequently cleared of all charges by 
the High Court.31)  It was a symptom of the technocrats’ marginalization from economic 
policy-making that Wahid’s first Coordinating Minister (Menko) for Economic Affairs, 
Kwik Kian Gie, went so far as to refer to his government as “they” and did not bother to 
coordinate.  No State Minister for National Development Planning was appointed, because 
the President wanted to undercut the power of BAPPENAS.32)
Under Megawati, who came to power in July 2001, restoring macro-economic stabil-
ity became the top priority.  Megawati appointed “professionals” who were unbound by 
party politics to two strategic posts for this objective.  Boediono33) was named Minister 
of Finance and Burhanuddin Abdullah replaced Syahril Sabirin as BI Governor.  Both 
Boediono and Burhanuddin did their jobs well to achieve macro-economic stability and 
banking sector reform to pave the way for Indonesia’s graduation from the IMF program. 
But the economic ministers did not work as a team.  Megawati confidant Kwik Kian Gie, 
appointed Minister of State for National Development Planning, openly attacked his own 
agency,  BAPPENAS, as a nest of corruption.
Megawati years also witnessed two major institutional developments in the eco-
nomic policy-making.  One was the enactment of Law Number 17 on State Finance in 
2003.  It introduced the European Union Maastricht treaty-type rule to achieve economic 
31) For Abdurrahman Wahid’s attempts to oust Syahril Sabirin from the BI governorship, see Fachry 
et al. (2003, Ch.5).  It should be noted that Abdurrahman Wahid even entertained the idea of liquidat-
ing the BI to oust him and that he was supported by some of the key players in the economic policy-
making in those days such as Kwik Kian Gie, Rizal Ramli, and Prijadi Praptosuhardjo.
32) Under normal circumstances, Djunaedi Hadisumarto should have inherited the mantle from 
Boediono to serve as State Minister for National Development Planning and Chief of BAPPENAS. 
A UI graduate and UI professor of economics, he had served as Secretary General of the Ministry 
of Transportation and Vice Chairman of BAPPENAS under Boediono before being promoted to 
Chairman of BAPPENAS in 1999.
33) Boediono was trained abroad (B.A., University of Western Australia; M.A., Monash University; 
Ph.D., Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania) and served as deputy for fiscal and 
monetary affairs at BAPPENAS (1988–93) and Deputy Governor of the BI (1993–98) before being 
made State Minister for National Development Planning and BAPPENAS Chief in 1998.
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and financial stability, legally requiring the government to keep the annual budget deficit 
below 3% of the GDP and the total government bonds issuance (both central government 
and local government bonds) below 60% of the GDP.  In other words, the law holds the 
government politically accountable for maintaining a self-restraining fiscal policy.
This law led to the reorganization of the Ministry of Finance, expanding its powers 
at the expense of BAPPENAS, the National Development Planning Agency.  The Agency 
for Economic, Fiscal, and International Cooperation Research was created out of the 
former Agency for Fiscal Analysis and was made responsible for budget making, while 
the budget planning function was assigned to the Directorate General for Budgetary and 
Fiscal Balance, which was created out of the former Directorate General of Budgeting. 
The power to make the Fiscal Policy and Macro Economic Framework, a power previ-
ously shared by BAPPENAS and MOF, came under MOF jurisdiction with the passing 
of the new law.  Equally important, the budget which had previously been classified as 
the routine budget and development budget and were respectively under the jurisdiction 
of the MOF and BAPPENAS came under MOF jurisdiction with the elimination of the 
routine and development budget distinction.  By abolishing the distinction, the law 
stripped BAPPENAS of its control over the development budget (Hill and Shiraishi 2007, 
123–141).
Under Soeharto, BAPPENAS was in charge of national planning, the development 
budget, coordination with foreign governments and international organizations for inter-
national assistance, and development project coordination and implementation.  This in 
effect made BAPPENAS the super ministry to oversee the entire economic policy-making. 
In its heyday, Widjojo Nitisastro, Soeharto’s most trusted economic adviser, served as 
Coordinating Minister for Economic and Fiscal Affairs, State Minister for National Develop-
ment Planning, and Chief of BAPPENAS simultaneously.  Under Soeharto, national 
development planning was implemented by presidential decree, not by law.  The legal 
status of BAPPENAS was not clearly defined.  Its effectiveness depended on its chief’s 
ability to work with Soeharto and on his commitment to prioritizing national development.
In the post-Soeharto era, BAPPENAS lost much of its powers.  A new law on the 
national development planning system was enacted in 2004 in the final days of the 
 Megawati presidency.  It granted legal status to BAPPENAS and stipulated that the Chief 
of BAPPENAS support the president in formulating the presidential national develop-
ment plan and assume responsibility for drafting the central government development 
plan.  Now, however, almost two thirds of budget for public works, for instance, is allo-
cated to provinces and districts/municipalities.  BAPPENAS not only lost its control over 
the development budget, but also has no say in almost two thirds of the public works 
budget.
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The Indonesian technocracy evolved under the New Order from 1966 to 1998 as a stra-
tegic component of its politics of stability and economic development.  Technocrats were 
instrumental in persuading Soeharto to adopt reform measures in the 1980s that imposed 
market discipline on the government’s developmental policies.  Indonesian technocrats 
as a group were effective because they were cohesive in their adherence to the three 
principles of balanced budget, open capital account, and pegged exchange rate system, 
and also because they enjoyed Soeharto’s confidence and could therefore function as his 
right arm in formulating and executing national development policies.  In the 1990s, 
however, technocrats faced increasing challenges from economic nationalists entrenched 
in the government agencies such as the Ministry of Industry, the Investment Coordina-
tion Agency and the BPPT/BPIS (Agency for State Strategic Industries), Soeharto’s 
family and crony business interests, and bureaucrats who were trained abroad and rose 
in their individual departmental hierarchies as career officials.  In their attempt to regain 
their power, technocrats tried to seize the opportunity offered by the 1997 currency 
crisis to persuade Soeharto to go to the IMF and to introduce reform measures, but the 
move backfired because technocrats lost his confidence.
The transitional governments led by B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and 
 Megawati Sukarnoputri sought institutional and political alternatives to the discredited 
Soeharto-era economic policy-making process.  These alternatives ranged from relying 
on technocrats while consulting key players in Indonesia’s economy and politics such as 
businessmen, mass media, politicians, public intellectuals, and future technocrats, as well 
as foreign governments and international organization (as Ginandjar Kartasasmita did as 
Coordinating Minister under Habibie) to outright disregard for technocracy and its insti-
tutional bulwark BAPPENAS (under Abdurrahman Wahid) to the empowerment of MOF 
for the sake of macro-economic stability at the expense of BAPPENAS and long-term 
national planning (under Megawati).
In retrospect, however, it is decentralized democracy, introduced in those transi-
tional years, which created a new set of conditions for a politics of economic growth: 
social divisions along ethnic and religious lines are no longer suppressed as they had been 
under Soeharto but are now contained locally, while the politics of economic growth is 
embraced not only by middle-class people who dominate local and national politics but 
more broadly by the population.  With the enactment of a series of laws governing the BI 
and government finance as well as constitutional revisions, a new institutional framework 
based on the two preeminent agencies of BI and MOF is now in place for macro-economic 
policy-making.  But technocrats are now more dependent on their ability to court public 
support for policy measures they are advocating and to secure the backing of the presi-
dent and the vice president who may or may not agree on any policy issue and whose 
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decisions on economic policy will be influenced by non-technical and highly political 
issues such as public reception, parliamentary approval, and personal chemistry.  The 
era of political demobilization during which technocrats had a freer hand in formulating 
economic policies and could rely on the backing of the president alone is over.  In retro-
spect, however, technocracy has never been shielded from “politics.”  If it once looked 
as if this had been the case under the New Order, it was because Soeharto used the 
enormous state power to demobilize popular politics.  But those days are over.  Although 
the institutional foundation is now in place for the independence of the Central Bank and 
the fiscal prudence of the Ministry of Finance, their performances ultimately depend on 
who runs these institutions and the complex political processes that inform their deci-
sions and operations.
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